The allure of the new Dodge Challenger is undeniable, yet for some, like myself, it sparks memories intertwined with both pride and a tinge of regret. As the former Director of Product Planning at Chrysler, I championed the inception of the 1970 “E” Body Barracuda and Challenger models, a project born from ambition yet marked by unforeseen market shifts.
In the mid-1960s, the “compact specialty car” segment, popularly known as “pony cars,” led by the Ford Mustang, Mercury Cougar, Chevrolet Camaro, Pontiac Firebird, and AMC Javelin, was experiencing explosive growth. Forecasting a significant 15% Chrysler penetration into this burgeoning 1,500,000-unit market, we confidently projected annual sales of 225,000 units. This conviction fueled our proposal to management: Chrysler needed to compete, head-on, with fully capable products. At the time, our sole contender was the Barracuda, an adaptation of the Valiant fastback, lacking the distinct sporty essence and proportions that defined the Mustang phenomenon.
During a pivotal Corporate Product Planning Committee meeting, I boldly assured management of achieving 200,000 annual sales. This figure resonated deeply with Manufacturing, aligning perfectly with the capacity of two eight-hour shifts running at 60 cars per hour. Finance concurred, projecting profitability at this volume. Consequently, the ambitious program for the new Barracuda and Challenger was greenlit.
BUT – reality diverged sharply from our projections.
We never even reached half of our ambitious target, consistently falling short of 100,000 E-body cars sold annually. The compact specialty car market plateaued below the million-unit mark, and our E-body sales struggled to capture even 15% of this reduced segment. The outcome was financially unfavorable, leaving management disillusioned, and product quality issues led to dissatisfied customers.
The shortfall in achieving planned volumes stemmed from a confluence of factors: an overly optimistic market forecast and, critically, shortcomings in build quality. Styling, specifications, and pricing, in retrospect, were not the primary culprits.
Reflecting on decisions, one stands out with particular clarity: the approval of polypropylene door trim panels. While innovative in concept, they proved to be hard and uninviting to the touch. Furthermore, dimensional inconsistencies plagued every panel, creating assembly line headaches. The material’s flexibility allowed assemblers to force fits, a practice heavily criticized by Bob Steere, then Chief Engineer of Car Assembly, due to long-term durability concerns and quality perceptions.
In the aftermath, I was fortunate to retain my position as Director of Product Planning. Yet, every sighting of an “E” Body seemed to evoke displeasure from John Riccardo, then President. Instead of a hoped-for promotion to Vice President, I found myself reporting to a newly appointed Vice President of Product Planning, George Butts. By 1974, both the Barracuda and Challenger were discontinued.
Following the E-body setback, my career path at Highland Park seemed limited. I strategically navigated towards a senior product role in Europe. This move proved transformative. Within four years, we achieved two European Car of the Year awards, surpassing new models from automotive giants like BMW, Ford, GM, and Renault. This European chapter significantly restored my professional confidence.
Today, a fascinating resurgence has occurred. Enthusiasts, particularly younger generations, now passionately embrace the “E” body ‘Cudas and Challengers. Automotive press outlets lavish praise on the 1970 models. This begs the question: where was this appreciation back in 1970 when it mattered most?
The Barracuda’s lineage traces back to an “A” Body platform. Prior experience with this approach revealed limitations in achieving truly sporty proportions and accommodating larger “B” engines.
The integration of the larger B engine necessitated a wider car design. Additional width was also incorporated to accommodate larger wheels and tires. While this enhanced the vehicle’s stance, it inevitably added both weight and cost.
The Challenger’s design philosophy was rooted in shared components with the Barracuda: door openings, windshield, cowl, and platform. Initial plans included shared door outer skins, mirroring the “A” body approach. However, during clay model development, it became evident that this interchangeability compromised the Challenger’s ability to project a unique identity. Consequently, the door skins became distinct to the Challenger, while other shared elements remained. Strategically, the Challenger was designed with a 2-3 inch longer wheelbase, akin to the Dart versus Valiant relationship, and positioned with a $100 higher market price point.
Roger Struck, a Product Planner involved in Advance Product Planning (1965), Dart/Challenger Product Planning (1967), and later Manager of Coronet/Charger Product Planning (1968), contributed significantly to this project.
My involvement with the “E” Body spanned from its initial conceptualization in Advance Planning, through guiding the Challenger portion into production. Initially envisioned as a light and agile “secretary’s car” under Cliff Voss’s direction, the project evolved significantly.
The muscle car era was reaching its zenith during the planning phase. The decision to incorporate larger ‘B’ engines, while catering to market trends, contributed to the car becoming heavier and less nimble, almost necessitating a “semi-marriage” to the larger ‘B’ Body platform. By the time the E-bodies reached the market, the muscle car fervor was waning, impacted by soaring insurance rates and escalating safety concerns entering the political discourse. One can only speculate whether a focus on the original light-and-nimble concept would have yielded greater market success. While the ‘Cuda cult might not exist today, profitability might have been a different story.
During a styling studio review of the “E Body” Challenger clay model, Elwood Engle, VP of design, suggested to Bill Brownlie, Dodge design chief, to elevate the main character line (the “B” line) along the side, addressing a perceived “dragging” appearance.
Another defining feature of the Challenger was its distinctive full-width rear taillights, considered groundbreaking at the time.
However, interior trim panels presented challenges. Colin Neale, chief of interior design, favored the sculpted aesthetic of molded plastic door trim panels. His intention to “soften” the hard touch with a textured surface proved insufficient. The panels remained hard, lacked sound dampening qualities, and amplified door rattles. While cost-effective and offering design flexibility, the tactile experience was undeniably unfriendly.
Bill Wetherholt, from the production side, recalls the heft of the doors, weighing 87 pounds before hardware and glass. Assembly line cranes, intended to assist in door installation, were often malfunctioning, requiring manual handling. Modern automation has since eliminated such physically demanding tasks.
Burton Bouwkamp interview | Bill Wetherholt interview
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