Ethics of Care

The moral theory known as “Ethics Of Care” emphasizes the moral importance of fundamental relationships and dependencies in human life. Normatively, care ethics aims to sustain relationships by considering and promoting the well-being of both caregivers and care receivers within a network of social connections. Often seen as a practice or virtue rather than a strict theory, “care” involves maintaining our world and addressing the needs of ourselves and others. It is driven by the desire to care for those who are dependent and vulnerable, inspired by memories of being cared for and ideals of self. Rooted in the sentimentalist tradition of moral theory, care ethics values caring motivation, emotion, and the body in moral decision-making, alongside reasoning from specific situations. Milton Mayeroff’s book, On Caring, was an early contribution, but care ethics became a distinct moral theory largely through the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan and philosopher Nel Noddings in the mid-1980s. They critiqued traditional moral approaches for gender bias and presented the “voice of care” as a valid alternative to the “justice perspective” of liberal human rights theory. Prominent subsequent contributors to care ethics include Annette Baier, Virginia Held, Eva Feder Kittay, Sara Ruddick, and Joan Tronto.

Frequently contrasted with deontological/Kantian and consequentialist/utilitarian ethics, care ethics shares similarities with moral perspectives such as African ethics, Confucian ethics, and others. Critics have argued that care ethics can be seen as a form of slave morality and has limitations, including potential essentialism, parochialism, and ambiguity. While care ethics is not synonymous with feminist ethics, much discussion has explored it as a feminine and feminist ethic, particularly in relation to motherhood, international relations, and political theory. Care ethics is broadly applied to various moral and ethical issues, such as caring for animals and the environment, bioethics, and increasingly, public policy. Initially considered most relevant to private and intimate aspects of life, care ethics has expanded into a political theory and social movement advocating for broader understanding and public support for caregiving in its diverse forms.

1. History and Major Authors

a. Carol Gilligan

While early forms of care ethics can be found in the writings of feminist philosophers like Mary Wollstonecraft, Catherine and Harriet Beecher, and Charlotte Perkins, it was explicitly developed by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings in the early 1980s. As a graduate student at Harvard, Gilligan’s dissertation outlined a different path of moral development than that proposed by her mentor, Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg had suggested that moral development progresses towards more universal and principled thinking and found that girls, when included in his studies, scored lower than boys. Gilligan criticized Kohlberg’s model for gender bias, noting a “different voice” than the justice-focused voice in Kohlberg’s model. She observed that both men and women expressed the voice of care, but emphasized that this voice would be largely missed without considering women’s perspectives. Challenging the view that moral reasoning in girls and women was immature due to its focus on immediate relationships, Gilligan asserted that the “care perspective” was an equally valid, alternative form of moral reasoning overlooked by masculine liberal justice traditions emphasizing autonomy and independence. She framed this difference as thematic rather than strictly gender-based.

Gilligan illustrated these thematic perspectives using the moral reasoning of “Jake” and “Amy,” children in Kohlberg’s studies responding to the “Heinz dilemma.” This dilemma asks if a man, “Heinz,” should steal an overpriced drug to save his ill wife. Jake views the Heinz dilemma as a problem of rights, where the right to life outweighs property rights, concluding Heinz should steal the drug. Amy, conversely, questions whether stealing the drug is the best approach, worrying about the consequences for Heinz and his wife if he is imprisoned. She sees the situation as a narrative of relationships needing repair through communication. Understanding the world as interconnected networks rather than individuals in isolation, Amy believes the druggist could be persuaded to help Heinz if the situation was explained. Gilligan argued that men and women often use different moral “languages” they assume are the same, and she aimed to correct the tendency to take the male perspective as the universal standard in moral reasoning.

Later, Gilligan strongly resisted interpretations of her work that linked care ethics primarily to gender rather than theme, and she emphasized the harmony between care and justice ethics (1986). However, she did not fully abandon her idea of an association between women and relational ethics. She further developed the concept of two distinct moral “voices” and their gender relationship in Mapping the Moral Domain: A Contribution of Women’s Thinking to Psychological Theory and Education (Gilligan, Ward, and Taylor, 1988). This collection of essays explored the dominance of the “justice perspective” in psychology and education and the implications of neglecting the “care perspective.” In Making Connections: The Relational Worlds of Adolescent Girls at Emma Willard School, Gilligan and her co-editors argued that ages eleven to sixteen are critical for girls’ identity formation, a period when girls learn to suppress their moral intuitions in favor of rule-based moral reasoning (Gilligan, Lyons, and Hamner, 1990, 3). Gilligan found that in adulthood, women are often pushed to resolve adolescent crises by prioritizing either selflessness/responsiveness or selfishness/independence. Consequently, women’s adolescent voices of resistance become silent, leading to a disconnection of self, mind, and body, potentially manifesting in eating disorders, limited leadership ambitions, and self-effacing sexual choices. Gilligan also expanded on these ideas in numerous articles and reports (Gilligan, 1979; 1980; 1982; 1987).

b. Nel Noddings

In 1984, Noddings published Caring, where she developed the idea of care as a feminine ethic and applied it to moral education. Starting with the premise that women “enter the practical domain of moral action…through a different door,” she attributed to feminine ethics a preference for direct, real-time moral deliberation and an appreciation for the uniqueness of each caring relationship. Drawing from a maternal perspective, Noddings considered caring relationships fundamental to human existence and consciousness. She identified two roles in a caring relationship: “one-caring” and “cared-for,” asserting that both have a form of reciprocal moral obligation, though not identical. She defined caring as “engrossment,” where the one-caring receives the cared-for on their own terms, avoiding self-projection and displacing selfish motives to act for the cared-for. Noddings located the origin of ethical action in two motivations: the natural human affective response of caring and the memory of being cared for, which shapes an ideal self. She rejected universal principles for action and judgment, arguing that care must always be applied contextually.

Noddings distinguished between two stages of caring: “caring-for” and “caring-about.” “Caring-for” refers to the practical application of caring actions, while “caring-about” is a state of nurturing caring ideas or intentions. She also argued that the scope of caring obligation is limited, strongest towards those capable of reciprocal relationships. This obligation extends outward in diminishing concentric circles, meaning broader care becomes less specific and context-sensitive. This led Noddings to suggest it is impossible to “care-for” everyone. She maintained a stronger obligation to care-for proximate humans and animals able to respond to care, but a lesser obligation to distant others if care is unlikely to be completed. These claims were controversial, and Noddings later revised them. In her book Starting From Home, Noddings endorsed a stronger obligation to care-about distant humans, recognizing it as crucial for inspiring local and global justice, while still holding that “caring-for” all, especially distant others, is impossible. (See 3a.iv below)

c. Other Influential Authors

While many philosophers have contributed to care ethics, five are particularly influential.

i. Annette Baier

Annette Baier notes connections between care ethics and the moral theory of David Hume, whom she calls the “women’s moral theorist.” Baier suggests both reject the idea that morality is about obeying universal laws, emphasizing the cultivation of virtuous character traits like gentleness, agreeability, compassion, sympathy, and good temper (1987, 42). Baier highlights trust, a basic relationship between individuals, as central to morality, often overlooked in theories focused on abstract, autonomous agents. She advocates for fostering moral emotions and harmonizing ideals of care and justice.

ii. Virginia Held

Virginia Held has edited and authored numerous books on care ethics. Much of her work seeks to move beyond liberal justice ideals, not by dismissing them, but by recognizing their limitations, and explores how social relations might be reshaped based on models of mothering persons and children. Grounded in the fundamental human need for care, Held sees care as the most basic moral value. In Feminist Morality (1993), Held examines the transformative potential of creating new social roles and a society prioritizing “the flourishing of children and the creation of human relationships.” She describes feminist ethics as committed to real experience, emphasizing reason and emotion, concrete rather than hypothetical individuals, embodiment, dialogue, and contextual methodologies. In The Ethics of Care (2006), Held demonstrates the relevance of care ethics to political, social, and global issues. Conceptualizing care as a set of practices and values, she describes a caring person as someone motivated to care for others and skilled in effective caring practices. She argues for limiting market-based care provisions and legalistic approaches to ethics, asserting that care ethics is better equipped to handle power and violence in all relations, including global ones. Specifically, she suggests a globally interdependent civil society relying on caring NGOs to solve problems. She notes: “The small societies of family and friendship embedded in larger societies are formed by caring relations… A globalization of caring relations would help enable people of different states and cultures to live in peace, to respect each others’ rights, to care together for their environments, and to improve the lives of their children”(168). Ultimately, she argues that rights-based moral theories assume a foundation of social connection, and that foregrounding care ethics can foster communities promoting healthy social relations, rather than unchecked self-interest.

iii. Eva Feder Kittay

Eva Feder Kittay is another key figure in care ethics. Her co-edited book with Diana T. Meyers, Women and Moral Theory (1987), is a significant anthology in the field. It maps conceptual territory inspired by Gilligan’s work, critically and supportively, exploring themes like self and autonomy, ethical principles and universality, feminist moral theory, and women and politics. In Love’s Labor (1999), Kittay develops a dependency-based account of equality rooted in caring for the seriously disabled. Kittay argues that egalitarian justice theories, like John Rawls’s, rely on more fundamental care principles and practices, and without these, they undermine themselves (108). Kittay observes that some women have only been able to leave traditional caregiving roles because other women have filled them, but she resists essentializing the link between women and care by using terms like “dependency workers” and “dependency relations.” She argues that equality for dependency workers and the dependent requires conceptual and institutional reform. Expanding fairness and reciprocity to include interdependence, Kittay proposes a third principle for Rawls’s justice theory: “To each according to his or her need, from each to his or her capacity for care, and such support from social institutions as to make available resources and opportunities to those providing care” (113). She specifically advocates for public Doulas, paid professional care workers supporting caregivers, using the Doula principle to justify welfare for all caregivers, akin to worker’s compensation or unemployment benefits.

iv. Sara Ruddick

Held identifies Sara Ruddick as a pioneer of care ethics, citing Ruddick’s 1980 article “Maternal Thinking” as the first articulation of a distinctively feminine ethical approach. In this article and her later book of the same title (1989), Ruddick uses care ethics to theorize from the lived experience of mothering, developing a unique approach to moral reasoning and a basis for a feminist politics of peace. Ruddick explains how “maternal practices” (performed by any gender) demonstrate cognitive capacities and virtues with broader moral relevance. Ruddick’s analysis, strongly linking care ethics and motherhood, has been both praised and debated (see Section 6, below).

v. Joan Tronto

Joan Tronto is best known for exploring the intersections of care ethics, feminist theory, and political science. She advocates for a feminist care ethic that challenges power imbalances and increases the value of activities that promote shared power. She identifies moral boundaries that have privatized care ethics and highlights the political dynamics of care relations, such as the tendency for women and minorities to perform care work that benefits social elites. She expands the stages of care to include “caring about,” “taking care of” (responsibility), “care-giving” (direct need fulfillment), and “care-receiving.” She coined “privileged irresponsibility” to describe how the advantaged can buy care services, delegate care work, and avoid responsibility for adequate hands-on care. (See Sections 2 and 8 below).

2. Definitions of Care

Care is notoriously hard to define due to its context-dependent nature. As Ruddick notes, at least three overlapping meanings of care have emerged: an ethic opposing justice, a type of labor, and a specific kind of relationship (1998, 4). In care ethics literature, “care” is often defined as a practice, value, disposition, or virtue, often portrayed as a set of overlapping concepts. For example, Held notes care is labor and an ideal guiding moral judgment and action, characterizing care as “clusters” of practices and values (2006, 36, 40). A popular definition by Tronto and Bernice Fischer defines care as “a species of activity that includes everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment.” This definition sees care as fundamentally a practice, but Tronto identifies four sub-elements, also seen as stages, virtues, or goals: (1) attentiveness, awareness of need; (2) responsibility, willingness to respond and take care of need; (3) competence, skill in providing good care; and (4) responsiveness, considering others’ perspectives and recognizing potential abuse in care (1994, 126-136). Tronto’s definition is praised for acknowledging cultural variation and extending care beyond domestic spheres, but criticized for being too broad, encompassing almost all human activity as care.

Other definitions of care are more specific. Diemut Bubeck narrows care by emphasizing personal interaction and dependency. She describes care as an emotional state, activity, or both, that is functional and involves “the meeting of needs of one person by another where face-to-face interaction between care and cared for is a crucial element of overall activity, and where the need is of such a nature that it cannot possibly be met by the person in need herself” (129). Bubeck distinguishes care from “service,” defining “care” as meeting needs of those unable to meet them themselves, while “service” meets needs of those capable of self-care. She also argues one cannot care for oneself, and care doesn’t require emotional attachment. While some care ethicists agree care need not always be emotional, Bubeck’s exclusion of self-care is rejected by others emphasizing other aspects of care.

For instance, Maurice Hamington and Daniel Engster include self-care in their definitions, focusing on bodily features and care goals (Hamington, 2004; Engster, 2007). Hamington focuses on embodiment: “care denotes an approach to personal and social morality that shifts ethical considerations to context, relationships, and affective knowledge in a manner that can only be fully understood if care’s embodied dimension is recognized. Care is committed to flourishing and growth of individuals, yet acknowledges our interconnectedness and interdependence” (2004, 3). Engster develops a “basic needs” approach, defining care as “everything we do to help individuals to meet their vital biological needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate unnecessary or unwanted pain and suffering, so that they can survive, develop, and function in society” (2007, 28). Though often unpaid, interpersonal, and emotional, Engster’s definition includes paid work, self-care, and doesn’t require affection (32). While these definitions emphasize care as practice, not all moral theorists agree.

Alternatively, care is seen as a virtue or motive. James Rachels, Raja Halwani, and Margaret McLaren argue for classifying care ethics as a form of virtue ethics, with care as a central virtue (Rachels, 1999; McLaren, 2001; Halwani, 2003). Michael Slote equates care with empathy as a motivational attitude, and Selma Sevenhuijsen defines care as “styles of situated moral reasoning” involving listening and responding to others on their own terms (Slote, 2007; Sevenhuijsen, 1998, 85).

Some ethicists prefer understanding care as a practice, not just a virtue or motive, to avoid romanticizing care as sentiment and highlight its breadth and global interconnectedness. Feminist ethicists Kittay and Held see care as practice and value, not just virtue, to avoid “losing sight of it as work” (Held, 2006, 35). Held argues “care” is “more a characterization of a social relation than the description of an individual disposition,” not just compassion or benevolence.

Overall, care remains a contested concept with ambiguities that Peta Bowden finds beneficial, revealing “the complexity and diversity of the ethical possibilities of care” (1997, 183).

3. Criticisms

Several criticisms have been made against care ethics, including that it is: a) a slave morality; b) empirically flawed; c) theoretically indistinct; d) parochial; e) essentialist; and f) ambiguous.

a. Care Ethics as a Slave Morality

An early criticism was that care ethics is a slave morality that glorifies women’s oppression (Puka, 1990; Card, 1990; Davion, 1993). The concept of slave morality comes from philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who argued oppressed groups develop moral theories that value subservient traits as virtues. In this view, care ethics‘ “different voice” arises from patriarchal traditions with rigid gendered labor divisions. This critique warns against uncritically valuing caring practices, as women often perform care work to their economic and political disadvantage. If care ethics encourages care without questioning who cares for whom and if these relationships are just, it is an inadequate basis for a truly liberating ethic. It implies the voice of care may be inauthentic or disempowering, a product of false consciousness equating moral maturity with self-sacrifice.

b. Care Ethics as Empirically Flawed

Critics also question the empirical accuracy of Gilligan’s studies, citing her narrow sample and homogenous groups like elite college students and women considering abortion (excluding those who might not see abortion as morally acceptable). Broader samples show more diverse results, complicating the idea of dual, gendered moral perspectives (Haan, 1976; Brabeck, 1983). For example, Vanessa Siddle Walker and John Snarey suggest the Heinz dilemma resolution changes if Heinz is Black in the US, where African-American men are disproportionately arrested and penalized (Walker and Snarey, 2004). Sandra Harding notes similarities between care ethics and African moralities, suggesting affinities with many traditions (Harding, 1987). Sarah Lucia Hoagland identifies care as central to lesbian relationships but cautions against assuming all care relations are ideally maternalistic (Hoagland, 1988). Thus, even if some women identify with care ethics, it’s unclear if this is a general trait of women, if moral development is distinctly gendered, or if the voice of care is the only alternative moral voice. However, Marilyn Friedman argues even if care isn’t uniquely female, it can be seen as symbolically feminine (Friedman, 1987).

c. Care Ethics as Theoretically Indistinct

Critics argue care ethics isn’t a distinct moral theory, and it incorporates liberal concepts like autonomy, equality, and justice. Some defenders of utilitarianism and deontology suggest existing theories already address care ethics‘ concerns (Nagl-Docekal, 1997; Ma, 2002). Others see care ethics as just virtue ethics, with care as one virtue (Rachels, 1999; Slote, 1998a; 1998b; McLaren, 2001, Halwani, 2003). While some care ethicists explore overlap with other theories, its distinctiveness is defended by those emphasizing its focus on social power, identity, relationship, and interdependency (Sander-Staudt, 2006). Most care ethicists acknowledge justice concerns and critically examine justice perspectives. Some view care and justice as mutually reinforcing. Others explore framing care as a right in liberal societies valuing human rights. Still others consider integrating care ethics with less liberal justice traditions like Marxism (Bubeck, 1995).

d. Care Ethics as Parochial

Another criticism is that care ethics is parochial and obscures larger social dynamics. This targets Noddings’ original claim that caregivers prioritize proximate others over distant ones (Tronto, 1995, 111-112; Robinson, 1999, 31). Critics worry this stance excuses elite caregivers from addressing global inequalities. They also fear that without a broader sense of justice, care ethics might allow for cronyism and favoritism (Friedman, 2006; Tronto, 2006). Noddings now includes justice in care ethics, opposing arbitrary favoritism and extending to public and international domains. Yet, she maintains the domestic sphere as the origin and model for justice, arguing the best social policies are rooted in “best families.” Other care ethicists refine Noddings’ claim by emphasizing connections between proximate and distant relations, advocating for care for the globally vulnerable, and integrating political components into care theory.

e. Care Ethics as Essentialist

The essentialist critique, from Elizabeth Spelman (1988), argues early care ethics failed to explore differences among women, presenting a uniform picture of moral development reinforcing gender stereotypes (Tronto, 1994). Critics challenge the dyadic mother-child model of care as overly romanticizing motherhood and misrepresenting diverse experiences (Hoagland, 1991). Essentialism in care ethics is problematic conceptually and politically for social justice. Women are implicated in care chains differently based on class, race, age, etc. In the US, women of color and white women have different caregiving and receiving experiences due to racial and economic inequalities. Lesbian and heterosexual women have unequal access to marriage benefits and are not equally assumed to be fit caregivers. Contemporary feminist care ethicists avoid essentialism by: examining care practices from multiple levels and perspectives; situating care in specific times and places; seeing care as symbolically feminine rather than actually so; exploring care as gender-neutral; and being mindful of perspective and privilege in moral theorizing.

f. Care Ethics as Ambiguous

Because it avoids abstract principles and fixed procedures, care ethics is often called ambiguous and lacking concrete ethical guidance (Rachels, 1999). Some care ethicists argue its non-principled nature is overstated, noting that eschewing some principles doesn’t mean rejecting all (Held, 1995). Central principles in care ethics might relate to care’s origin and basic need, evaluating need claims, care obligations, and care distribution scope. In principle, care ethics guides moral agents to recognize relational interdependency, care for self and others, cultivate attention, response, respect, completion skills, and maintain just and caring relationships. While derived from actual practices, care ethicists resist subjectivism and moral relativism.

4. Feminine and Feminist Ethics

Due to its association with women, care ethics is often seen as a feminine ethic. Indeed, care ethics, feminine ethics, and feminist ethics are often used interchangeably. However, while overlapping, they are distinct. Not all feminine and feminist ethics are care ethics, and the necessary link between care ethics and femininity is debated. The idea of a distinct woman-oriented or feminine ethical approach has historical roots. Attempts to legitimize it grew in the 18th and 19th centuries, with some suffragettes arguing women’s suffrage would improve social morality. Central to feminine ethics is the idea that women share a common perspective, rooted in motherhood, and that feminine traits include compassion, empathy, nurturance, and kindness.

However, recognizing women’s diversity and men’s capacity for care, it’s unclear if care ethics is solely feminine. Many women, historically and contemporarily, do not exhibit care, and factors like ethnicity and class also correlate with care thinking. Still, care is often symbolically feminine, and many women resonate with a care perspective. Feminist care ethics differs from feminine care ethics by critically examining the empirical and symbolic links between women and care, and by addressing the power implications of this association. Alison Jaggar defines feminist ethics as exposing biases in moral theory, understanding actions in social contexts, highlighting differences among women, guiding private, public, and international issues, and respecting women’s experiences critically (Jaggar, 1991).

While most agree care ethics isn’t just a “woman’s morality,” its relation to sex and gender is debated. Slote develops a gender-neutral theory, tracing care ethics to both male and female philosophers. Engster endorses a “minimally feminist theory” that’s largely gender-neutral, defining care as meeting general human needs. While acknowledging women’s disadvantage in care distribution and socialization towards self-effacing care, his theory is feminist primarily in ensuring women and girls’ basic needs and capabilities are met.

Held, Kittay, and Tronto see stronger links between care and feminist theory, retaining but challenging gendered associations using terms like “mothering persons” or “dependency workers.” While cautious about linking care and femininity, they find value in women’s lived experiences, like childbirth. They define care as a practice partly to acknowledge ongoing associations between care and women, informing visions of care as gender-neutral. Further complicating matters, women exhibiting “male” traits like competitiveness may gain social privilege, suggesting revaluing feminine traits and activities is as important as stressing care’s gender-neutral potential.

Currently, care ethicists agree women are positioned differently than men regarding care practices, but there’s no consensus on theorizing sex and gender in care ethics.

5. Relation to Other Theories

Care ethics initially emerged as an alternative to Kantian deontology and utilitarian consequentialism, but it is seen as related to African ethics, David Hume’s sentimentalism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, Levinasian ethics, and Confucianism. The most common comparison is with virtue ethics, with care ethics sometimes categorized as a form of virtue ethics, with care as a central virtue. Identifying caring virtues strengthens this classification, though it’s not universally accepted.

Some theorists integrate care and virtue ethics strategically. Slote seeks an alliance against “masculine” moral theories like Kantianism, utilitarianism, and social contract theory (Slote, 1998). He argues this helps care ethics address obligations to strangers without needing problematic justice theories. McLaren argues virtue theory provides a normative framework lacking in care ethics (McLaren, 2001). For both, care ethics‘ flaw is neglecting justice standards in care distribution and practice, and relegating care to the private sphere, exacerbating care burdens in liberal societies. McLaren argues virtue theory offers care ethics a standard of appropriateness and a normative framework: “The standard of appropriateness is the mean—a virtue is always the mean between two extremes…The normative framework stems from the definition of virtue as that which promotes human flourishing” (2001, 105). Feminist critics resist this assimilation, fearing it dilutes care ethics‘ unique focus (Held, 2006; Sander-Staudt, 2006). They believe feminist care ethics can address justice concerns and doubt virtue ethics is the best framework.

Similar debates surround care ethics and Confucianism. Similarities include both being considered virtue ethics (Li, 1994, 2000; Lai Tao, 2000), emphasizing relationships as fundamental, avoiding general principles, highlighting parent-child relations, seeing moral responses as graduated, and valuing emotions like empathy and compassion. The most common comparison is between care and the Confucian concept of jen/ren, often translated as love or humanity. Some argue enough overlap exists to see care ethics and Confucian ethics as remarkably similar (Li, 1994; Rosemont, 1997).

However, others see care ethics and Confucian ethics as distinct due to potential incompatibilities. Feminist care ethicists argue against Confucianism’s subordination of women. Ranjoo Seodu Herr sees incompatibility between Confucian li (ritual standards) and feminist care ethics‘ resistance to subjugation (2003). Lijun Yuan doubts Confucian ethics is acceptable to contemporary feminists despite similarities to care ethics. Daniel Star categorizes Confucian ethics as virtue ethics but distinguishes it from care ethics by differing biases in moral perception (2002). Star argues care ethics is not tied to tradition, downplays principles (beyond revision), and rejects hierarchical, role-based relationships in favor of contextual responses.

There are also arguments against the incompatibility of care ethics with Kantian deontology and liberal human rights theory. Care ethicists dispute that care and justice are inherently incompatible just because they evolved separately. Some deny Kantianism is strictly principled and rationalistic, arguing care ethics is compatible with Kantian deontology because it can be based on a universal care imperative and a principle of caring obligation. A Kantian categorical imperative adaptation can ground care obligation in its universal necessity and the inconsistency of willing a world without care. Others compare compatibility between care ethics and liberal Kantian concepts. Grace Clement argues individual autonomy is required by care ideals, as caregivers should consent and retain autonomy, and foster autonomy in care receivers (Clement, 1996). Mona Harrington explores liberal equality’s significance to care ethics, linking women’s inequality to undervaluing care work (Harrington, 2000). Kantianism can also supplement care ethics by checking caring practices (denouncing using others as mere means) and providing a framework for establishing care as a right.

6. Maternalism

As a theory rooted in care practices, care ethics emerged from analyzing reasoning and activities associated with mothering. Though some caution against seeing all care relations through a mother-child lens, Ruddick and Held use a maternal perspective to expand care ethics as a moral and political theory. Ruddick argues “maternal practice” generates specific thinking and supports principled resistance to violence. Ruddick notes some mothers support violence and war, but they should not because it threatens care goals. Defining a mother as “a person who takes responsibility for children’s lives and for whom providing child care is a significant part of his or her working life,” Ruddick clarifies both men and women can be mothers (40). She identifies metaphysical attitudes, cognitive capacities, and virtues associated with mothering: preservative love (protection with cheerfulness and humility), fostering growth (nurturing a child’s development), and training for social acceptability (socialization requiring conscience and authenticity struggle). Because children are subject to social expectations but also defy them, mothers’ power is limited by “the gaze of the others.” Loving attention helps mothers perceive children and themselves honestly to foster growth without fantasy or self-loss.

Expanding on pregnancy and birth, Ruddick argues mothers should oppose a strict male/female division as untrue to children’s sexual identities. Mothers should challenge the rigid gender division in military ideology because it threatens birth’s promise. Ruddick creates a feminist maternal care ethics rooted in human bodies’ vulnerability, promise, and power, transforming motherhood symbols into political speech by resisting denial.

However, while useful, the mothering paradigm is seen by many as limited and problematic for care ethics. Some critics reject Ruddick’s view of mothering as inherently peaceful, noting it can require violent protectiveness. Though Ruddick acknowledges maternal violence and war support, some are unconvinced warfare is always illogical and universally against maternal practice. Despite Ruddick’s acknowledgement of violence in mothering, others object that a motherhood paradigm is too narrowly dyadic and romantic, implying mother-child relationship traits are universal qualities of all relationships. Thus, even agreeing on the mother-child relationship’s significance, some care ethicists seek to broaden care ethics by exploring other care work paradigms like friendship and citizenship.

7. International Relations

Care ethics was initially seen as having little relevance to international relations, emphasizing known individuals and particular selves, seemingly unsuited for relations with distant or hostile others. Fiona Robinson challenges this, developing a critical care ethic addressing global dependency and vulnerability (Robinson, 1999). Robinson expands care to address global inequalities, promoting a care ethic responsive to difference without assuming universal homogeneity. She argues universal rights principles often fail to alleviate real suffering. She believes a feminist phenomenological care ethic can by exploring the actual nature and possibilities of global relations. She finds cosmopolitanism and communitarianism’s focus on nation-states and the global primacy of liberal values like autonomy and self-determination have led to a “culture of neglect,” supported by devaluing interdependence and positive interaction with distant others. A critical care ethic sees the global order not as unified but as structures exploiting differences to exclude and dominate. While Robinson doubts a “more caring world” can eliminate poverty and suffering entirely, she believes a critical care ethic can motivate global care.

Similarly, Held hopes care ethics can transform international state relations by recognizing masculine constructs in state behaviors and advocating for cooperative values over hierarchy and domination based on gender, class, race, and ethnicity (Held, 2006). Care ethicists continue to explore its application to international relations in the context of global care needs and the international care supply and demand met by migrant women.

8. Political Theory

As a political theory, care ethics examines social justice, including social benefits and burdens distribution, legislation, governance, and entitlement claims. Seyla Benhabib’s “The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory” (Benhabib, 1986) was an early exploration of care ethics‘ implications for feminist political theory. Benhabib traces a dichotomy in political and moral theory between public and private realms. The public is the realm of justice, social and historical context, and generalized others, while the private is the realm of the good life, the natural and atemporal, and concrete others. The public realm is captured by social contract theory and the “state of nature,” where men roam as adults, alone, independent, and free from birth ties. Benhabib traces this metaphor, internalized by the male ego, in the political philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, and Rawls, and the moral theories of Kant and Kohlberg. She argues this conception makes human interdependency, difference, and private life questions irrelevant to politics.

Joan Tronto offers an early substantial account of care as political philosophy, identifying the traditional ethics-politics boundary as one of three hindering a woman’s care ethic‘s political efficacy (along with boundaries between particular and abstract moral observers, and public and private life) (Tronto, 1993). These boundaries obscure how care as a political concept reveals human interdependency and how care could stimulate democratic and pluralistic US politics by empowering the disenfranchised. Following Tronto, feminist care ethicists explore care ethics‘ implications for various political concepts. Bubeck adapts Marxist arguments to show care work’s social necessity and exploitation; Sevenhuijsen reformulates citizenship to include caring needs and work; and Kittay develops a dependency-based equality concept (Bubeck, 1995; Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Kittay, 1999). Others examine care ethics‘ relevance to welfare policy, restorative justice, political agency, and global business.

Daniel Engster provides the most comprehensive articulation of care ethics as political theory, defending a need-based moral obligation (Engster, 2007). Engster’s “minimal capability theory” rests on two premises: all humans depend on others to develop basic capabilities, and receiving care logically obligates individuals to care for others. Engster sees care as practices informed by three virtues: attention, responsiveness, and respect. Defining care as satisfying vital biological needs, developing basic capabilities, and avoiding suffering, Engster applies these goals to domestic politics, economic justice, international relations, and culture. Engster holds governments and businesses responsible for economic provisions during illness, disability, old age, misfortune, and for protection, healthcare, clean environments, and basic rights. He calls for businesses to balance care and commodity production by making work and care compatible, though care goals need not fully subordinate profitability.

According to Engster, care ethics as political theory is universally applicable because dependency is ubiquitous, but care practice varies and has no necessary link to any political system, including Marxism or liberalism. Governments should primarily care for their own populations but also assist citizens of abusive regimes within reasonable limits. International humanitarian interventions are more obligatory than military ones given harm risks, and care virtues can help avoid humanitarian assistance dangers. Regarding US cultural practices, Engster recommends policy changes in education, employment, and media.

9. Caring for Animals

While Gilligan was largely silent on animal moral status in care ethics, Noddings stated humans only have moral obligations to proximate animals capable of reciprocity. Based on this, she believes one is obligated to care for a stray cat and safely remove spiders from the house, but not to care for stray rats or become vegetarian. She rejects Peter Singer’s claim that favoring humans over animals is speciesist. Other care ethicists, like Rita Manning, emphasize differences in obligations to care for companion, domesticated, and wild animals based on “carefully listening to the creatures who are with you in [a] concrete situation” (Manning, 1992; 1996).

Carol Adams and Josephine Donovan have most thoroughly explored care ethics application to animal moral status (Adams and Donovan 1996; 2007). Expanding on Adams’ sexual politics of meat analysis (Adams, 1990), they argue feminist care offers a better basis for animal ethics. They question if rights theory is adequate for animal defense due to its rationalist roots and individualist ontology, tendency to extend rights based on human traits, devaluing of emotion and body, and preference for abstract rules. Alternatively, they argue feminist care is a preferable foundation for animal moral obligations because its relational ontology acknowledges love and empathy in human-animal connections, and its contextual flexibility allows nuanced animal consideration across a difference continuum.

Engster similarly argues human obligation to care for non-human animals is limited by their dependency on humans (Engster, 2006). Because care obligation is rooted in dependency, humans aren’t morally obligated to care for non-dependent animals. However, obligation arises when humans make animals dependent by providing food or shelter. Engster suggests veganism or vegetarianism aren’t required if animals live happy lives and are humanely slaughtered, but acknowledges most animals live in atrocious conditions that care ethics opposes.

Empirical studies suggest gender differences in animal moral status views. Women are more strongly against animal research and meat-eating and more willing to sacrifice for these causes than men (Eldridge and Gluck, 1996). While feminist care ethicists are cautious about automatically endorsing these views, eco-feminists like Marti Kheel link feminism, animal advocacy, environmental ethics, and holistic health movements (Kheel, 2008). Advocating for a stronger animal care obligation, Kheel emphasizes the uniqueness of all animals and broadens care obligation to all individuals and collectives, noting most animal welfare philosophies adopt masculine approaches based on abstract rules, rational principles, and generalized perspectives.

10. Applied Care Ethics

Besides the topics above, care ethics has been applied to timely ethical debates, including reproductive technology, homosexuality and gay marriage, capital punishment, political agency, hospice care, HIV treatment, and aspects of popular culture like U-2’s music and The Sopranos. It increasingly informs moral analysis in professions like education, medicine, nursing, and business, prompting new topics and inquiries. It’s used for moral assessment in bioethics, business ethics, and environmental ethics. Perhaps because medicine explicitly involves care, care ethics was quickly adopted in bioethics to assess relational and embodied aspects of medical practices and policies. Susan Sherwin and Rosemary Tong consider how feminist ethics, including care ethics, provides insights into contraception and sterilization, artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, and gene therapy, as well as abortion. Other authors apply care ethics to organ transplantation, high-risk patient care, artificial womb technologies, advanced directives, and ideal doctor-patient relationships.

11. Care Movements

Social movements are increasingly organized around care ethics concerns. In 2000, Deborah Stone called for a US national care movement to highlight the need for social care programs like universal healthcare, preschool, elder care, improved foster care, and caregiver wages. In 2006, Hamington and Dorothy Miller compiled essays on care ethics theory and application to public life, including welfare, same-sex marriage, restorative justice, corporate globalization, and the 21st-century mother’s movement (Hamington and Miller, 2006). Formal political care organizations exist, mostly online, focusing on motherhood, fatherhood, healthcare, care as a profession, infant welfare, women’s movements, gay and lesbian rights, disability, and elder care. These groups disseminate information, organize care advocates on social issues, and form voting blocs. MomsRising.org, by Joan Blades and Kristin Rowe-Finkbeiner, is prominent among mothering-focused groups. Others include The Mothers Movement Online, Mothers Ought to Have Equal Rights, the National Association of Mothers’ Centers, and Mothers and More. Judith Stadtman Tucker notes problems with some mother’s movements, like over-focusing on white, middle-class caregivers and occasional lack of seriousness, but is hopeful mother-focused care movements can drive cultural transitions, including shorter work weeks, universal healthcare decoupled from employment, care leave policies, and increased male and state involvement in care work (Tucker, 2001).

12. References and Further Reading

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Adams, C. and Donovan, J. Beyond Animal Rights: A feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals. New York: Continuum, 1996.
Adams, C. and Donovan, J. The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
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Blades, Joan and Rowe-Finkbeiner, Kristin. The Motherhood Manifesto: What America’s Moms Want and What to do about It. New York, NY: Nation Books, 2006.
Bowden, Peta. “An ‘Ethics of Care’ in Clinical Settings: Encompassing ‘Feminine” and “Feminist” Perspectives.” Nursing Philosophy 1.1 (2001): 36-49.
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Brabeck, Mary. “Moral Judgment: Theory and Research on Differences between males and Females” Developmental Review 3 (1983) 274-91.
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Clement, Grace. Care, Autonomy and Justice: Feminism and the Ethic of Care. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.
Davion, Victoria. “Autonomy, Integrity, and Care” Social Theory and Practice 19.2 (1993) 161-82.
Donovan, Josephine and Adams, Carol, ed. Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals. New York, NY: Continuum Press, 1996.
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Author Information

Maureen Sander-Staudt Email: [email protected] Arizona State University U. S. A.

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