What is an Ethic of Care? Exploring the Foundations and Applications

The moral theory known as “care ethics” centers on the idea that relationships and interdependence are fundamental to human life and hold significant moral weight. From a normative standpoint, care ethics prioritizes the maintenance of relationships by understanding and supporting the well-being of both caregivers and care receivers within a network of social connections. Often characterized as a practice or virtue rather than a formal theory, “care” encompasses the ongoing effort to sustain our world and address the needs of ourselves and others. It is rooted in the innate desire to care for those who are vulnerable and dependent, drawing inspiration from our own experiences of being cared for and our idealized notions of self. In line with the sentimentalist tradition in moral philosophy, care ethics acknowledges the crucial role of caring motivations, emotions, and embodied experiences in moral reasoning, alongside the importance of context-specific considerations.

While elements of care ethics can be found in Milton Mayeroff’s insightful book, On Caring, the formal emergence of care ethics as a distinct moral theory is largely attributed to the groundbreaking work of psychologist Carol Gilligan and philosopher Nel Noddings in the mid-1980s. Both Gilligan and Noddings challenged traditional moral frameworks, arguing that they exhibited a male bias. They championed the “voice of care” as a valid alternative to the “justice perspective” that dominated liberal human rights theory. Building on their foundational work, numerous scholars have made significant contributions to the field of care ethics, including Annette Baier, Virginia Held, Eva Feder Kittay, Sara Ruddick, and Joan Tronto, among many others.

Care ethics is often contrasted with deontological ethics (associated with Kant) and consequentialist ethics (like utilitarianism). Interestingly, it shares common ground with other moral perspectives such as African ethics and Confucian ethics. However, care ethics has also faced criticism, with some arguing that it resembles a “slave morality” and suffers from limitations such as essentialism, parochialism, and ambiguity. Despite these critiques, care ethics has been extensively explored as a feminine and feminist ethic, particularly in relation to motherhood, international relations, and political theory. Its practical relevance is evident in its wide application to diverse moral issues and ethical fields, including animal and environmental ethics, bioethics, and increasingly, public policy. Initially conceived as most relevant to personal and private life, care ethics has expanded into a political theory and social movement advocating for a broader understanding and public support for the multifaceted nature of caregiving.

1. History and Major Authors

a. Carol Gilligan

While traces of care ethics can be seen in the writings of early feminist thinkers like Mary Wollstonecraft and Catherine Beecher, Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings are recognized for bringing it into sharp focus in the early 1980s. Gilligan’s seminal work originated from her doctoral dissertation at Harvard University, where she proposed a different model of moral development than that of her mentor, Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg’s theory suggested a progressive movement towards universal and principled moral reasoning, and his studies, which later included girls, showed that girls consistently scored lower than boys in moral development. Gilligan challenged Kohlberg’s model, arguing it was inherently biased towards a male perspective and pointed to a “different voice” beyond the justice-oriented framework of Kohlberg’s theory. She observed that while both men and women could express the voice of care, it was women’s voices that were crucial to its recognition in her studies. Rejecting the notion that girls’ and women’s moral reasoning was less mature due to its focus on immediate relationships, Gilligan asserted that the “care perspective” was an equally valid, yet previously overlooked, form of moral reasoning, overshadowed by masculine liberal justice traditions emphasizing autonomy and independence. She emphasized that this difference was thematic rather than strictly gender-based.

Gilligan famously illustrated these contrasting perspectives through the moral reasoning of “Jake” and “Amy,” two children in Kohlberg’s research who were responding to the “Heinz dilemma.” This dilemma poses the question of whether a man, Heinz, should steal an expensive drug to save his dying wife when he cannot afford it. Jake approached the Heinz dilemma as a logical problem, seeing it as a conflict of rights where the right to life overrides property rights. He reasoned that any rational person would conclude Heinz should steal the drug. Amy, however, viewed the dilemma differently. She questioned whether stealing the drug was the best course of action, fearing the repercussions for Heinz and his wife if he were imprisoned. Amy saw the situation as a narrative of ongoing relationships and emphasized the importance of communication and mending fractured connections. Understanding the world as a web of relationships, Amy believed that open communication could lead to a resolution where the druggist might be willing to negotiate with Heinz once the dire situation was explained. Gilligan argued that men and women often used different moral “languages” while assuming they were speaking the same one, and she aimed to correct the tendency to mistake the male perspective as the universal standard for moral reasoning.

Later in her career, Gilligan strongly resisted interpretations that linked care ethics too closely to gender, emphasizing the thematic nature of her work and highlighting the potential harmony between care and justice ethics (1986). However, she never entirely dismissed the observed association between women and relational ethics. She further developed the concept of distinct moral “voices” and their connection to gender in Mapping the Moral Domain: A Contribution of Women’s Thinking to Psychological Theory and Education (Gilligan, Ward, and Taylor, 1988). This collection of essays explored the dominance of the “justice perspective” within psychology and education, and the implications of excluding the “care perspective.” In Making Connections: The Relational Worlds of Adolescent Girls at Emma Willard School, Gilligan and her co-editors argued that adolescence, particularly between eleven and sixteen, is a critical period for girls’ identity formation. During this time, girls often learn to suppress their inner moral intuitions in favor of more rule-bound interpretations of moral reasoning (Gilligan, Lyons, and Hamner, 1990, 3). Gilligan observed that adult women are often encouraged to resolve adolescent crises by prioritizing either selflessness/responsiveness or selfishness/independence, creating a false dichotomy. Consequently, women’s adolescent voices of resistance become silenced, leading to a disconnect between self, mind, and body, potentially manifesting in eating disorders, diminished leadership ambitions, and self-effacing choices in relationships. Gilligan further elaborated on these ideas in numerous articles and reports (Gilligan, 1979; 1980; 1982; 1987).

b. Nel Noddings

In her influential 1984 book, Caring, Nel Noddings explored the concept of care as a specifically feminine ethic and its application to moral education. Starting with the premise that women approach moral action from a “different door,” she attributed to feminine ethics a preference for direct, face-to-face moral deliberation in real-time and a deep appreciation for the unique nature of each caring relationship. Drawing inspiration from a maternal perspective, Noddings considered caring relationships as fundamental to human existence and consciousness. She identified two key roles in a caring relationship: the “one-caring” and the “cared-for.” She asserted that both parties have a reciprocal moral obligation to care, albeit in different ways. Noddings characterized caring as “engrossment,” where the one-caring genuinely receives the cared-for on their own terms, resisting the urge to project their own self onto the other and setting aside selfish motives to act in the best interest of the cared-for. She located the origins of ethical action in two sources: our natural affective response, the inherent human capacity for caring, and the memory of being cared for, which shapes our ideal self. Noddings rejected universal principles as prescriptive guides for action and judgment, arguing that care must always be applied contextually and with sensitivity to the specific situation.

Noddings distinguished between two stages of caring: “caring-for” and “caring-about.” “Caring-for” refers to the practical, hands-on application of caring actions, while “caring-about” describes a state of mind where one cultivates caring thoughts and intentions. She further argued that the scope of our caring obligation is inherently limited, being strongest towards those capable of reciprocal relationships. Noddings envisioned caring obligation as expanding outwards in concentric circles, with care becoming less specific and contextually nuanced as it extends further. This led her to suggest that it is impossible to genuinely “care-for” everyone. She maintained that while we have a strong obligation to care for those proximate to us, humans and animals, who are in need and can respond to our care, our obligation diminishes for distant others, especially if there is no realistic hope of our care being meaningfully received or completed. These claims sparked considerable controversy, and Noddings later revised them to some extent. In her more recent work, Starting From Home, Noddings acknowledged a stronger obligation to “care-about” distant individuals, recognizing it as an important motivating force for promoting justice both locally and globally. However, she continued to assert the practical impossibility of “caring-for” everyone, particularly those far removed from our immediate lives (See 3a.iv below).

c. Other Influential Authors

Beyond Gilligan and Noddings, many philosophers have contributed to the development of care ethics. Five authors are particularly noteworthy for their influential work.

i. Annette Baier

Annette Baier draws connections between care ethics and the moral philosophy of David Hume, whom she playfully refers to as a “women’s moral theorist.” Baier suggests that both perspectives reject the notion that morality is solely about adhering to universal laws. Instead, they emphasize the cultivation of virtuous character traits rooted in sentiment, including gentleness, agreeability, compassion, sympathy, and good temper (1987, 42). Baier particularly highlights trust, a fundamental element in relationships between individuals, as the cornerstone of morality. She argues that traditional theories, focused on abstract and autonomous agents, often overlook the importance of trust. Baier advocates for creating space for the development of moral emotions and fostering harmony between the ideals of care and justice.

ii. Virginia Held

Virginia Held is a leading voice in care ethics, both as an author and editor of numerous influential works in the field. Her work often seeks to move beyond the limitations of liberal justice ideals, not by dismissing them as flawed, but by recognizing their incompleteness. Held explores how social relations might be reimagined if modeled on the dynamics of mothering and child-rearing. She posits that the fundamental human need for care, which is inherently non-contractual, is the most basic moral value. In her book Feminist Morality (1993), Held examines the transformative potential of creating new kinds of social beings and envisions a society where “its most important task [is] the flourishing of children and the creation of human relationships.” She characterizes feminist ethics as deeply rooted in actual lived experience, emphasizing the importance of reason and emotion, real individuals rather than hypothetical constructs, embodiment, genuine dialogue, and context-sensitive, lived methodologies. In The Ethics of Care (2006), Held demonstrates the broad relevance of care ethics to political, social, and global issues. She defines care as a cluster of practices and values, describing a caring person as someone who is motivated to care for others and skillfully engages in effective caring practices. Held argues for limiting both market-driven approaches to care and the over-reliance on legalistic thinking in ethics, asserting that care ethics offers superior resources for addressing power dynamics and violence inherent in all relationships, including those at the global level. Specifically, she advocates for a vision of a globally interdependent civil society that increasingly relies on caring NGOs to address pressing issues. She notes: “The small societies of family and friendship embedded in larger societies are formed by caring relations… A globalization of caring relations would help enable people of different states and cultures to live in peace, to respect each others’ rights, to care together for their environments, and to improve the lives of their children” (168). Ultimately, Held argues that rights-based moral theories presuppose a foundation of social connection. By foregrounding care ethics, we can cultivate communities that prioritize healthy social relationships, moving away from an excessive focus on self-interest.

iii. Eva Feder Kittay

Eva Feder Kittay is another prominent and influential care ethicist. Her co-edited volume with Diana T. Meyers, Women and Moral Theory (1987), is a landmark anthology in care ethics. This collection critically and supportively examines the conceptual landscape inspired by Gilligan’s work, delving into key philosophical themes such as self and autonomy, ethical principles and universality, feminist moral theory, and women and politics. In her book Love’s Labor (1999), Kittay develops a dependency-based understanding of equality, rooted in the experience of caring for individuals with serious disabilities. Kittay argues that principles of egalitarian justice, such as those proposed by John Rawls, are actually dependent on more fundamental principles and practices of care. Without this essential foundation of care, these theories become self-undermining (108). Kittay observes that in practice, some women have been able to move beyond traditional caregiving roles precisely because other women, often women of color or those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, have taken their place. However, she resists essentializing the connection between women and care, preferring to speak of “dependency workers” and “dependency relations,” highlighting the social and economic dimensions of care work. Kittay argues that achieving true equality for both dependency workers and those who are inevitably dependent requires fundamental conceptual and institutional reforms. She proposes expanding traditional notions of fairness and reciprocity to embrace interdependence as a central element. Kittay suggests a third principle to supplement Rawls’ theory of justice: “To each according to his or her need, from each to his or her capacity for care, and such support from social institutions as to make available resources and opportunities to those providing care” (113). More specifically, she advocates for the public provision of Doulas, paid professional care workers who provide support for caregivers, using the concept of the Doula to justify welfare provisions for all caregivers, similar to worker’s compensation or unemployment benefits.

iv. Sara Ruddick

Virginia Held identifies Sara Ruddick as a pioneer of care ethics, citing Ruddick’s 1980 article “Maternal Thinking” as the first clear articulation of a distinctively feminine approach to ethics. In this article and her subsequent book of the same title (1989), Ruddick utilizes a care ethics methodology to theorize from the lived experience of mothering, offering a unique perspective on moral reasoning and a foundation for a feminist politics of peace. Ruddick explores how the practices of “maternal persons” (which can include both men and women) demonstrate cognitive capacities and virtues that have broader moral significance. Ruddick’s analysis, which establishes strong links between care ethics and motherhood, has been both influential and controversial (see Section 6 below).

v. Joan Tronto

Joan Tronto is primarily known for her work exploring the intersections of care ethics, feminist theory, and political science. She advocates for a feminist care ethic designed to challenge existing power structures that concentrate power in the hands of the already powerful and to elevate the value of activities that promote shared power. Tronto identifies moral boundaries that have historically served to privatize the implications of care ethics and highlights the political dynamics inherent in care relations. For example, she points out the tendency for women and marginalized groups to disproportionately perform care work in ways that benefit social elites. Tronto expands the stages of care to include: “caring about” (recognizing the need for care), “taking care of” (assuming responsibility for addressing the need), “care-giving” (directly meeting the need), and “care-receiving.” She coined the term “privileged irresponsibility” to describe the phenomenon where those most advantaged in society can afford to purchase care services, delegate care work to others, and avoid taking responsibility for ensuring the adequacy of hands-on care. (See Sections 2 and 8 below).

2. Definitions of Care

Due to its inherent contextual nature, “care” is notoriously difficult to define definitively. As Sara Ruddick points out, at least three distinct but overlapping meanings of care have emerged in recent decades: care as an ethic in contrast to justice, care as a form of labor, and care as a particular type of relationship (1998, 4). However, in care ethics literature, “care” is most often defined as a practice, value, disposition, or virtue, and is frequently presented as a set of interconnected concepts. For instance, Virginia Held notes that care is both a form of labor and an ideal that guides moral judgment and action. She characterizes care as “clusters” of practices and values (2006, 36, 40). One widely cited definition of care, offered by Joan Tronto and Bernice Fischer, describes care as “a species of activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment.” This definition fundamentally positions care as a practice, but Tronto further identifies four sub-elements of care that can be understood simultaneously as stages, virtuous dispositions, or goals. These are: (1) attentiveness, the inclination to recognize needs; (2) responsibility, the willingness to respond and address those needs; (3) competence, the skill in providing effective and quality care; and (4) responsiveness, considering the perspective of others and acknowledging the potential for power imbalances and abuse within care relationships (1994, 126-136). Tronto’s definition is praised for its recognition of cultural variations in care practices and its expansion of care beyond the confines of family and domestic spheres. However, it has also been criticized for being overly broad, potentially encompassing nearly every human activity as “care.”

Other definitions of care offer more specific boundaries. Diemut Bubeck narrows the definition by emphasizing personal interaction and dependency. She describes care as an emotional state, an activity, or both, that is functional and specifically involves “the meeting of needs of one person by another where face-to-face interaction between care and cared for is a crucial element of overall activity, and where the need is of such a nature that it cannot possibly be met by the person in need herself” (129). Bubeck distinguishes care from “service” by specifying that “care” involves meeting the needs of those who are unable to meet their needs themselves, while “service” addresses the needs of individuals who are capable of self-care. She also argues that one cannot “care for” oneself and that care does not necessarily require emotional attachment. While some care ethicists agree that care does not always need an emotional component, Bubeck’s exclusion of self-care is challenged by others who emphasize different aspects of care.

For example, both Maurice Hamington and Daniel Engster include self-care in their definitions of care but focus more precisely on bodily aspects and the ultimate aims of care (Hamington, 2004; Engster, 2007). Hamington emphasizes embodiment, stating that: “care denotes an approach to personal and social morality that shifts ethical considerations to context, relationships, and affective knowledge in a manner that can only be fully understood if care’s embodied dimension is recognized. Care is committed to flourishing and growth of individuals, yet acknowledges our interconnectedness and interdependence” (2004, 3). Engster develops a “basic needs” approach to care, defining it as a practice that includes “everything we do to help individuals to meet their vital biological needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate unnecessary or unwanted pain and suffering, so that they can survive, develop, and function in society” (2007, 28). While care is often unpaid, interpersonal, and emotionally laden work, Engster’s definition does not exclude paid care work, self-care, or require the presence of affection or other emotions (32). Although these definitions emphasize care as a practice, not all moral theorists subscribe to this view.

Alternatively, care is understood as a virtue or motive. James Rachels, Raja Halwani, and Margaret McLaren have advocated for classifying care ethics as a form of virtue ethics, with care as a central virtue (Rachels, 1999; McLaren, 2001; Halwani, 2003). The idea that care is best understood as virtuous motivation or communicative skill is supported by Michael Slote, who equates care with a motivational attitude of empathy, and by Selma Sevenhuijsen, who defines care as “styles of situated moral reasoning” that involve listening and responding to others on their own terms (Slote, 2007; Sevenhuijsen, 1998, 85).

Some ethicists prefer to understand care as a practice rather than a virtue or motive because this approach resists the tendency to romanticize care as merely a sentiment or disposition. It also highlights the breadth of caring activities that are globally interconnected and woven into virtually all aspects of life. Feminist ethicists like Kittay and Held favor understanding care as a practice and value because it avoids “losing sight of it as work” (Held, 2006, 35). Held argues against defining care primarily as a disposition like compassion or benevolence, stating that “care” is “more a characterization of a social relation than the description of an individual disposition.”

Overall, care remains an essentially contested concept, with ambiguities that Peta Bowden finds beneficial, revealing “the complexity and diversity of the ethical possibilities of care” (1997, 183).

3. Criticisms

Care ethics has faced numerous criticisms, including the arguments that it is: a) a slave morality; b) empirically flawed; c) theoretically indistinct; d) parochial; e) essentialist; and f) ambiguous.

a. Care Ethics as a Slave Morality

One of the earliest and most significant criticisms leveled against care ethics is that it represents a form of “slave morality” that inadvertently valorizes the oppression of women (Puka, 1990; Card, 1990; Davion, 1993). The concept of “slave morality” originates from the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who argued that oppressed groups tend to develop moral systems that reframe subservient traits as virtues. Following this line of thought, the criticism of care ethics as a slave morality suggests that the “different voice of care” is not an authentic expression of female morality, but rather a product of patriarchal societies characterized by rigid gender roles and the unequal division of labor. This critique cautions against uncritically celebrating caring practices and inclinations, as women who predominantly perform care work often do so at their own economic and political disadvantage. To the extent that care ethics encourages care without questioning who is caring for whom and whether these relationships are just, it provides an inadequate foundation for a truly liberating ethic. This objection further implies that the “voice of care” may not be an empowering voice at all, but rather a manifestation of false consciousness that equates moral maturity with self-sacrifice and self-effacement.

b. Care Ethics as Empirically Flawed

Critics have also challenged the empirical accuracy and validity of Carol Gilligan’s research. Gilligan’s studies have been criticized for relying on too narrow a sample and for drawing conclusions from overly homogenous groups, such as students at elite colleges and women considering abortion (thereby excluding women with differing moral perspectives on abortion). It is argued that broader, more diverse samples yield more complex results that complicate the picture of dual and gendered moral perspectives (Haan, 1976; Brabeck, 1983). For example, Vanessa Siddle Walker and John Snarey suggest that responses to the Heinz dilemma may shift significantly if Heinz is identified as Black. In the United States, African-American males are disproportionately more likely to be arrested for crimes and less likely to have their cases dismissed without severe penalties, potentially altering the perceived risks and moral calculus in the dilemma (Walker and Snarey, 2004). Sandra Harding points out similarities between care ethics and African moralities, noting that care ethics shares affinities with various other moral traditions beyond a specifically “feminine” perspective (Harding, 1987). Sarah Lucia Hoagland identifies care as central to lesbian relationships but also warns against assuming that all care relations are ideally maternalistic (Hoagland, 1988). Therefore, even if some women resonate with care ethics, it remains unclear whether this is a universal characteristic of women, whether moral development is distinctly and dualistically gendered, and whether the “voice of care” is the only alternative moral voice. However, scholars like Marilyn Friedman maintain that even if care cannot be definitively proven as a uniquely female moral orientation, it can still be plausibly understood as a symbolically feminine approach (Friedman, 1987).

c. Care Ethics as Theoretically Indistinct

Along similar lines, some critics argue that care ethics lacks distinct theoretical grounding and that it readily incorporates liberal concepts such as autonomy, equality, and justice, blurring its unique contribution. Some proponents of utilitarianism and deontology suggest that the concerns raised by care ethics have already been, or could easily be, addressed within existing ethical frameworks (Nagl-Docekal, 1997; Ma, 2002). Others propose that care ethics is simply a subset of virtue ethics, with “care” being just one virtue among many (Rachels, 1999; Slote, 1998a; 1998b; McLaren, 2001, Halwani, 2003). While many care ethicists explore potential overlaps between care ethics and other moral theories, some contemporary advocates defend the distinctiveness of care ethics, arguing that its focus on social power, identity, relationship, and interdependence sets it apart (Sander-Staudt, 2006). Most care ethicists acknowledge the importance of justice considerations and critically examine various justice perspectives. In some cases, care and justice perspectives are seen as mutually reinforcing and complementary. Other theorists highlight the strategic potential of framing care as a “right” within liberal societies that rhetorically value human rights. Still others explore the benefits of integrating care ethics with less liberal justice traditions, such as Marxism (Bubeck, 1995).

d. Care Ethics as Parochial

Another set of criticisms centers on the concern that care ethics is overly parochial, obscuring larger social dynamics and lacking a broader perspective. These critiques target Nel Noddings’ initial assertion that caregivers have primary obligations to those close to them over distant others (Tronto, 1995, 111-112; Robinson, 1999, 31). Critics worry that this stance could privilege elite caregivers, excusing them from addressing significant global inequalities in living standards and their root causes. There is also concern that without a broader sense of justice, care ethics might lead to cronyism and favoritism towards family and friends, potentially neglecting wider social obligations (Friedman, 2006; Tronto, 2006). Noddings has since incorporated an explicit theme of justice into care ethics to address concerns about arbitrary favoritism and to extend its application to public and international domains. However, she still maintains the primacy of the domestic sphere as the origin and nurturing ground for justice, suggesting that the best social policies are identified, modeled, and sustained by practices found in “best families.” Other care ethicists refine Noddings’ claims by emphasizing the practical and moral connections between proximate and distant relationships, advocating for a principle of care for the most vulnerable globally, and explicitly integrating a political dimension into care theory.

e. Care Ethics as Essentialist

The objection that care ethics is essentialist stems from Elizabeth Spelman’s broader critique of essentialism (1988). Following this argument, early versions of care ethics have been criticized for failing to adequately explore the diversity among women (and other caregivers) and for presenting a uniform picture of moral development that reinforces gender stereotypes (Tronto, 1994). Critics challenge the tendency within care ethics to theorize care based on a dyadic model of a (caregiving) mother and a (care-receiving) child. This model is seen as overly romanticizing motherhood and failing to represent the vast range of individual experiences (Hoagland, 1991). The charge of essentialism in care ethics highlights how women and men are implicated differently in care chains depending on factors like class, race, age, and other social variables. Essentialism in care ethics is problematic not only conceptually but also due to its political implications for social justice. For instance, in the United States, women of color and white women occupy different positions in terms of who is more likely to give and receive care, and the quality and type of care received, largely because the lowest-paid care workers are disproportionately women of color. Similarly, lesbian and heterosexual women have different access to the benefits and burdens of marriage and are not equally perceived as fit caregivers. Contemporary feminist care ethicists attempt to avoid essentialism through various strategies, including: more thoroughly examining care practices across multiple levels and from diverse perspectives; situating caring practices within specific historical and social contexts; understanding care as a symbolic rather than inherently female voice; exploring the potential of care as a gender-neutral activity; and consistently being mindful of perspective and privilege in moral theorizing.

f. Care Ethics as Ambiguous

Because care ethics often avoids abstract principles and rigid decision-making procedures, it is frequently accused of being unduly ambiguous and failing to provide concrete guidance for ethical action (Rachels, 1999). However, some care ethicists argue that the non-principled nature of care ethics is overstated. They point out that while care ethics may reject certain types of principles, it does not necessarily reject all principles entirely (Held, 1995). Principles that could be considered central to care ethics might relate to the origins and fundamental need for care relationships, the evaluation of care needs, the obligation to care, and the equitable distribution of care. In principle, a care ethic guides the moral agent to recognize relational interdependence, care for oneself and others, cultivate skills of attention, responsiveness, respect, and completion, and maintain just and caring relationships. While care ethicists define care ethics as a theory derived from actual practices, they simultaneously resist subjectivism and moral relativism, seeking to find a balance between contextual sensitivity and ethical grounding.

4. Feminine and Feminist Ethics

Due to its association with women’s experiences, care ethics is often considered a “feminine ethic.” Indeed, care ethics, feminine ethics, and feminist ethics are sometimes used interchangeably. However, while there are overlaps, these are distinct fields. While care ethics often emphasizes traits traditionally associated with femininity, not all feminine and feminist ethics are care ethics, and the presumed necessary link between care ethics and femininity has been rigorously debated. The idea of a distinctively woman-oriented or feminine approach to ethics has historical roots. Attempts to legitimize this perspective gained momentum in the 18th and 19th centuries, fueled by some suffragettes who argued that granting voting rights to (white) women would lead to moral improvements in society. Central assumptions of feminine ethics include the idea that women share enough commonality to have a unified perspective, often rooted in the biological capacity and social expectation of motherhood, and that characteristically feminine traits include compassion, empathy, nurturance, and kindness.

However, once we acknowledge the diversity among women and recognize that many men also exhibit strong caring tendencies, the notion that care ethics is solely or uniquely feminine becomes less clear. Many women, both in reality and in cultural representations, across history and in contemporary times, do not consistently exhibit care. Other aspects of social identity, such as ethnicity and class, have also been found to correlate with care-oriented thinking. Nonetheless, care has been persistently assumed to be a symbolically feminine trait and perspective, and many women do identify with a care perspective. The distinction between feminine and feminist care ethics hinges on the degree of critical inquiry into the empirical and symbolic association between women and care, and the concern for the power dynamics embedded in this association. Alison Jaggar defines a feminist ethic as one that exposes masculine and other biases in moral theory, understands individual actions within social contexts, illuminates differences among women, provides guidance for private, public, and international issues, and treats women’s experiences respectfully, but not uncritically (Jaggar, 1991).

While most theorists agree that it is inaccurate to view care ethics as exclusively “woman’s morality,” the best way to understand its relationship to sex and gender remains debated. Michael Slote develops a strictly gender-neutral theory of care, arguing that care ethics draws from the work of both male and female philosophers. Daniel Engster advocates for a “minimally feminist theory of care” that is largely gender-neutral because he defines care as meeting basic human needs. While acknowledging that women are disadvantaged in current care distributions and are often socialized to value self-effacing care, his theory is feminist primarily in its aim to ensure that the basic needs of women and girls are met and their capabilities are developed.

In contrast, Virginia Held, Eva Feder Kittay, and Joan Tronto propose stronger connections between care and feminist theory, retaining and yet challenging the gendered associations of care through language like “mothering persons” or “dependency workers.” While cautious about essentializing the link between care and femininity, they find it valuable to draw upon the lived and embodied experiences of women, particularly the shared experience of the capacity to give birth. They tend to define care as a practice, in part to remain mindful of the ongoing empirical (though potentially misleading) associations between care and women, which must inform utopian visions of care as a gender-neutral activity and virtue. Adding further complexity, individuals who are assigned female at birth may still gain social privilege by exhibiting traits perceived as “masculine,” such as competitiveness and independence. This suggests that revaluing traditionally “feminine” traits and activities is as important as emphasizing the gender-neutral potential of care ethics.

Currently, care ethicists agree that women are positioned differently from men in relation to caring practices. However, there is no clear consensus on the most effective way to theorize sex and gender within care ethics, representing an ongoing area of exploration and debate.

5. Relation to Other Theories

Care ethics initially emerged as an alternative to Kantian deontology and utilitarian consequentialism. However, it is recognized as having affinities with various other moral theories, including African ethics, David Hume’s sentimentalism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, Levinasian ethics, and Confucianism. The most prominent comparison has been between care ethics and virtue ethics, to the extent that care ethics is sometimes categorized as a specific type of virtue ethics, with “care” being a central virtue. The identification of caring virtues reinforces this classification, although it is not universally accepted.

Some theorists strategically seek to integrate care and virtue ethics. Michael Slote aims to create an alliance against traditional “masculine” moral theories like Kantianism, utilitarianism, and social contract theory (Slote, 1998). He argues that this alliance allows care ethics to address obligations to strangers without relying on potentially problematic theories of justice. Margaret McLaren suggests that virtue theory provides a normative framework that care ethics currently lacks (McLaren, 2001). Both authors perceive a weakness in care ethics concerning justice standards in the distribution and practice of care, and its tendency to relegate care to the private sphere, exacerbating the isolation and individualization of care burdens in liberal societies. McLaren argues that virtue theory provides care ethics with both a standard of appropriateness and a normative framework: “The standard of appropriateness is the mean—a virtue is always the mean between two extremes…The normative framework stems from the definition of virtue as that which promotes human flourishing” (2001, 105). However, feminist critics resist this assimilation, fearing it may dilute the unique focus of care ethics (Held, 2006; Sander-Staudt, 2006). They remain optimistic that feminist versions of care ethics can adequately address justice concerns and doubt that virtue ethics offers the most suitable normative framework.

Similar debates surround the comparison between care ethics and Confucianism. Philosophers have noted several parallels between these two ethical systems, notably that both are often classified as virtue ethics (Li, 1994, 2000; Lai Tao, 2000). Additional similarities include their emphasis on relationships as fundamental to being, their avoidance of rigid general principles, the central role of the parent-child relationship, the idea of graduated moral responses, and the recognition of emotions like empathy, compassion, and sensitivity as prerequisites for moral action. The most common point of comparison is between the concept of care and the Confucian concept of jen/ren. Ren is often translated as “benevolence” or “humanity.” Several scholars argue that the overlap between care and ren is significant enough to suggest that care ethics and Confucian ethics are remarkably similar and compatible systems of thought (Li, 1994; Rosemont, 1997).

However, some philosophers argue that it is more accurate to view care ethics as distinct from Confucian ethics due to potential incompatibilities. Feminist care ethicists argue that a feminist care ethic is fundamentally incompatible with the way Confucianism often subordinates women within hierarchical social structures. Ranjoo Seodu Herr identifies the incompatibility in the Confucian emphasis on li, or formal ritualistic standards, which clashes with feminist care ethics’ resistance to subjugation (2003). Similarly, Lijun Yuan doubts that Confucian ethics can ever be fully acceptable to contemporary feminists, despite its similarities to care ethics. Daniel Star categorizes Confucian ethics as a virtue ethic but distinguishes it from care ethics by arguing that they involve different biases in moral perception (2002). According to Star, care ethics differs from Confucian ethics in its lack of dependence on any particular tradition, its downplaying of principles (versus merely acknowledging their revisability), and its rejection of hierarchical, role-based relationship categories in favor of contextual and particular responses.

There are also arguments refuting the belief that care ethics is conceptually incompatible with the justice perspectives of Kantian deontology and liberal human rights theory. Care ethicists challenge the assumption that because care and justice have evolved as distinct practices and ideals, they must be inherently incompatible. Some argue that Kantianism is not as rigidly principled and rationalistic as often portrayed and maintain that care ethics is compatible with Kantian deontology because it can be grounded in a universal injunction to care and a principle of caring obligation. An adaptation of Kant’s categorical imperative can be used to ground the obligation to care in the universal necessity of care and the inherent inconsistency in willing a world without the intention to care. Other theorists explore the compatibility between care ethics and concepts central to the Kantian liberal tradition. For instance, Grace Clement argues that an ideal of individual autonomy is actually required by normative ideals of care. Caregivers ideally consent to and maintain some degree of autonomy in caring relationships and ideally foster the autonomy of care receivers (Clement, 1996). Mona Harrington examines the significance of the liberal ideal of equality for care ethics, tracing how women’s inequality is linked to the low social value and inadequate provision of care work (Harrington, 2000). Other ways Kantianism is seen as potentially beneficial to care ethics include serving as a supplementary check on caring practices (denouncing caring relations that exploit others as mere means) and providing a rhetorical framework for establishing care as a right.

6. Maternalism

As a theory deeply rooted in practices of care, care ethics largely emerged from analyses of the reasoning and activities associated with mothering. While some critics caution against overgeneralizing care relations based on a mother-child dyad, Sara Ruddick and Virginia Held utilize a maternal perspective to expand care ethics into a comprehensive moral and political theory. In particular, Ruddick argues that “maternal practice” generates specific modes of thinking and fosters a principled resistance to violence. Ruddick emphasizes that while some mothers may support violence and war, they should ideally oppose it because it directly contradicts the goals and essence of care. Defining a mother as “a person who takes responsibility for children’s lives and for whom providing child care is a significant part of his or her working life,” Ruddick clarifies that both men and women can be mothers (40). She identifies key metaphysical attitudes, cognitive capacities, and virtues associated with mothering: preservative love (the work of protection with cheerfulness and humility), fostering growth (supporting and nurturing a child’s development), and training for social acceptability (a socialization process that requires conscience and a commitment to authenticity). Because children are both shaped by and resistant to social expectations, the powers of mothers are inherently limited by the “gaze of the others.” Loving attention helps mothers perceive their children and themselves honestly, enabling them to foster growth without resorting to idealized fantasies or losing their own sense of self.

Expanding on the profound significance of the bodily experiences of pregnancy and birth, Ruddick argues that mothers should challenge rigid divisions between masculinity and femininity, as these divisions are ultimately untrue to children’s complex sexual identities. In doing so, mothers should challenge the rigid separation of male and female traits characteristic of military ideology because it fundamentally threatens the hope and promise embodied in birth and new life. Ruddick develops a feminist account of maternal care ethics grounded in the vulnerability, promise, and power of human bodies. By resisting simplistic denial and embracing the complexities of maternal experience, she argues that the symbols of motherhood can be transformed into powerful forms of political speech.

However, despite the usefulness of the mothering paradigm for care ethics, many find it to be a limited and potentially problematic framework. Some critics reject Ruddick’s suggestion that mothering is inherently peaceful, noting that mothering may sometimes necessitate protective violence and forceful responses to threats. While Ruddick acknowledges that many mothers do support military actions and undermine peace movements, some critics remain unconvinced that warfare is always illogical and universally opposed to maternal practice. Despite Ruddick’s awareness of violence within mothering, others object that a motherhood paradigm presents an overly narrow, dyadic, and idealized model. They argue that this approach mistakenly implies that the characteristics of a mother-child relationship can be universally applied as worldly qualities of all relationships. For these reasons, some care ethicists, even while acknowledging the significance of the mother-child relationship, have sought to broaden the scope of care ethics by exploring alternative paradigms of care work, such as friendship and citizenship, to provide richer and more diverse understandings of care in various contexts.

7. International Relations

Care ethics was initially perceived as having limited relevance to the complexities of international relations. With its emphasis on known individuals and particular relationships, care ethics seemed ill-suited to guide interactions with distant or potentially hostile others on a global scale. However, Fiona Robinson challenges this assumption by developing a critical ethics of care that attends to the global dimensions of dependency and vulnerability (Robinson, 1999). Robinson’s analysis expands the concept of care to address inequalities within current international relations, advocating for a care ethic that is responsive and attentive to the diversity of others without imposing a homogenous universalism. She argues that universal principles of right and wrong often fail to generate effective moral responses that alleviate the suffering of real people in specific contexts. However, she expresses optimism that a feminist phenomenological approach to care ethics can be more effective by exploring the actual nature, conditions, and possibilities of global relations. Robinson contends that the overemphasis on the nation-state in cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, combined with the enforced global dominance of liberal values like autonomy, independence, and self-determination, has led to a “culture of neglect.” This culture is sustained by a systemic devaluation of interdependence, interconnectedness, and positive engagement with distant others. A critical ethic of care understands the global order not as emerging from a unified or homogenous humanity, but from complex power structures that exploit differences to exclude, marginalize, and dominate. While Robinson acknowledges the unlikelihood of achieving “a more caring world” where poverty and suffering are entirely eliminated, she believes that a critical care ethic can offer an alternative mode of response capable of motivating global care and fostering more just and compassionate international relations.

Similarly, Virginia Held expresses hope that care ethics can transform international relations between states by challenging culturally constructed notions of masculinity in state behaviors and advocating for cooperative values to replace hierarchy and domination based on gender, class, race, and ethnicity (Held, 2006). Care ethicists continue to explore the application of care ethics to international relations in various contexts, including addressing the global need for care and examining the international supply and demand for care labor often met by migrant populations of women.

8. Political Theory

As a political theory, care ethics examines fundamental questions of social justice, including the distribution of social benefits and burdens, the nature of legislation and governance, and the validity of claims of entitlement. One of the earliest explorations of the implications of care ethics for feminist political theory was Seyla Benhabib’s influential article “The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory” (Benhabib, 1986). In this work, Benhabib identifies a fundamental dichotomy in political and moral theory between the public and private realms. The public realm is typically associated with justice, social and historical concerns, and generalized others, while the private realm is linked to the good life, the natural and timeless, and concrete others. The favored metaphor of social contract theory and the “state of nature,” where men are depicted as adults, alone, independent, and free from the bonds of birth through women, exemplifies this dichotomy. Benhabib traces this metaphor, deeply embedded in the male ego, within the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Rawls, and the moral theories of Immanuel Kant and Lawrence Kohlberg. She argues that under this dominant conception, human interdependence, difference, and questions about private life become politically marginalized and irrelevant.

The first comprehensive account of care as a political philosophy is offered by Joan Tronto, who identifies the traditional boundary between ethics and politics as one of three boundaries that hinder the political effectiveness of a woman’s care ethic. The other two boundaries are the division between the particular and abstract/impersonal moral observer, and the separation between public and private life (Tronto, 1993). Collectively, these boundaries obscure how care, as a political concept, illuminates the inherent interdependence of human beings and how care ethics could foster more democratic and pluralistic politics, particularly in contexts like the United States, by providing a platform for politically disenfranchised groups. Following Tronto’s work, numerous feminist care ethicists have explored the implications of care ethics for a range of political concepts. Diemut Bubeck adapts Marxist arguments to highlight the social necessity and current exploitation of care work. Selma Sevenhuijsen redefines citizenship to be more inclusive of caring needs and care work. Eva Feder Kittay develops a dependency-based concept of equality (Bubeck, 1995; Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Kittay, 1999). Other scholars examine the relevance of care ethics to political issues such as welfare policy, restorative justice, political agency, and global business practices.

The most comprehensive articulation of care ethics as a political theory is presented by Daniel Engster, who defends a need-based account of moral obligation (Engster, 2007). Engster’s “minimal capability theory” rests on two key premises: that all human beings are fundamentally dependent on others to develop their basic capabilities, and that in receiving care, individuals implicitly and logically become obligated to care for others in turn. Engster understands care as a set of practices guided by three core virtues: attention, responsiveness, and respect. Defining care as everything we do to meet vital biological needs, develop and maintain basic capabilities, and prevent unnecessary suffering, Engster applies these goals to domestic politics, economic justice, international relations, and culture. He argues that governments and businesses have a responsibility to provide economic support during times of illness, disability, old age, misfortune, and economic downturns, as well as to ensure protection, healthcare, clean environments, and the upholding of basic individual rights. Engster calls for businesses to balance caring responsibilities with commodity production, making work and care more compatible, although he acknowledges that care goals need not completely override economic objectives like profitability.

According to Engster, care as a political theory has universal application because conditions of dependency are ubiquitous across human societies. However, the specific practices of care may vary across groups and cultures, and care ethics is not inherently tied to any particular political system, including Marxism or liberalism. Governments should primarily care for their own populations but also have a responsibility to assist citizens of other nations living under abusive or neglectful regimes, within reasonable limits. International humanitarian interventions are generally more obligatory than military interventions due to the inherent risk of physical harm, and the virtues of care can help the international community navigate the complexities and potential pitfalls of humanitarian assistance. Specifically addressing cultural practices in the U.S., Engster recommends policy changes in education, employment, and media to better reflect and support the values of care.

9. Caring for Animals

While Carol Gilligan remained relatively silent on the moral status of animals within care ethics, Nel Noddings made it clear that humans have moral obligations only to animals that are proximate, receptive to care, and capable of reciprocity. Based on these criteria, she suggests that while one has a moral obligation to care for a stray cat that appears at one’s door and to safely remove spiders from the house, there is no such obligation to care for a stray rat or to become a vegetarian. She also rejects Peter Singer’s argument that favoring humans over animals is a form of speciesism. However, other care ethicists, such as Rita Manning, emphasize the nuances in our obligations to care for companion animals, domesticated animals, and wild animals. She stresses the importance of “carefully listening to the creatures who are with you in [a] concrete situation” to guide our ethical responses (Manning, 1992; 1996).

The application of care ethics to the moral status of animals has been most extensively explored by Carol Adams and Josephine Donovan (Adams and Donovan 1996; 2007). Building on Adams’ groundbreaking analysis of the sexual politics of meat (Adams, 1990), they argue that a feminist care tradition offers a superior ethical framework for animal ethics. They question whether rights theory is an adequate foundation for animal advocacy due to its rationalist roots and individualist ontology, its tendency to extend rights to animals based on human-like traits, its devaluation of emotion and embodiment, and its preference for abstract, formal, and quantifiable rules. Alternatively, they propose that a feminist care ethic is a more suitable foundation for grounding moral obligations to animals because its relational ontology acknowledges love and empathy as crucial bases for human-animal connections. Its contextual flexibility allows for a more nuanced consideration of animals across a spectrum of differences, rather than relying on rigid rights-based categories.

Daniel Engster similarly argues that the human obligation to care for non-human animals is limited by the extent of their dependency on humans (Engster, 2006). Since the obligation to care is rooted in dependency, humans do not inherently have moral obligations to care for animals that are not dependent on human actions. However, a moral obligation to care for animals arises when humans create dependency by providing food or shelter. Engster suggests that neither veganism nor vegetarianism are strictly required by care ethics, provided that animals are allowed to live happy, mature lives and are humanely slaughtered. However, he acknowledges that the vast majority of animals in industrial agriculture live under conditions that care ethics would strongly condemn.

Empirical studies indicate interesting gender differences in how men and women perceive the moral status of animals. Notably, women tend to be more strongly opposed to animal research and meat consumption and report a greater willingness to make sacrifices for animal welfare than men (Eldridge and Gluck, 1996). While feminist care ethicists are cautious about automatically endorsing these views based solely on empirical correlations, eco-feminists like Marti Kheel explore the connections between feminism, animal advocacy, environmental ethics, and holistic health movements (Kheel, 2008). Advocating for a more robust obligation to care for animals, Kheel emphasizes the inherent uniqueness of all animals and broadens the scope of moral obligation to encompass all individual beings and larger collectives. She notes that the majority of philosophical approaches to animal welfare often adopt masculine frameworks grounded in abstract rules, rational principles, and generalized perspectives, potentially overlooking the specific needs and experiences of individual animals and their relationships within ecosystems.

10. Applied Care Ethics

Beyond the areas discussed above, care ethics has been applied to a wide range of contemporary ethical debates, including reproductive technologies, homosexuality and same-sex marriage, capital punishment, political agency, hospice care, and HIV treatment. It has also been used to analyze aspects of popular culture, such as the music of U-2 and the television series The Sopranos. Care ethics increasingly informs moral analysis in various professions, including education, medicine, nursing, and business, prompting new lines of inquiry and ethical considerations within these fields. It serves as a valuable framework for moral assessment in established ethical subfields like bioethics, business ethics, and environmental ethics. Perhaps because medicine is a profession explicitly centered on caring for others, care ethics was quickly adopted within bioethics as a means to assess relational and embodied dimensions of medical practices and policies. In addition to abortion, Susan Sherwin and Rosemary Tong, among others, have explored how feminist ethics, including care ethics, offer new insights into contraception and sterilization, artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, and gene therapy. Care ethics is also applied to topics such as organ transplantation, the care of high-risk patients, artificial womb technologies, advance directives, and the ideal relationships between medical practitioners and patients, enriching the ethical discourse in these complex areas.

11. Care Movements

There is a growing number of social movements organized around the core concerns highlighted by care ethics. In 2000, Deborah Stone called for the formation of a national care movement in the U.S. to raise awareness about the urgent need for social programs supporting care, such as universal healthcare, preschool education, elder care, improved foster care systems, and adequate wages for caregivers. In 2006, Maurice Hamington and Dorothy Miller compiled essays examining the theoretical understanding and practical application of care ethics to public life, addressing issues like welfare, same-sex marriage, restorative justice, corporate globalization, and the contemporary mother’s movement (Hamington and Miller, 2006). Numerous formal political organizations focused on care exist, primarily online, addressing themes such as motherhood, fatherhood, healthcare, care as a profession, infant welfare, the women’s movement, LGBTQ+ rights, disability rights, and elder care advocacy. These organizations work to disseminate information, mobilize care advocates around key social issues, and build political influence. Among those focused on mothering, prominent examples include MomsRising.org, co-founded by Joan Blades (a founder of MoveOn.org) and Kristin Rowe-Finkbeiner, The Mothers Movement Online, Mothers Ought to Have Equal Rights, the National Association of Mothers’ Centers, and Mothers and More. Judith Stadtman Tucker notes that some mother’s movements have faced challenges, including an overly narrow focus on the interests of white, middle-class caregivers and occasional lack of political seriousness. However, she remains optimistic that care movements organized around motherhood can drive significant cultural shifts, including shorter work weeks, universal healthcare decoupled from employment, robust care leave policies, and increased participation of men and state institutions in care work (Tucker, 2001).

12. References and Further Reading

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Benhabib, Seyla. “The Generalized and Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory”, in Praxis International (1986) 38-60.
Blades, Joan and Rowe-Finkbeiner, Kristin. The Motherhood Manifesto: What America’s Moms Want and What to do about It. New York, NY: Nation Books, 2006.
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Author Information

Maureen Sander-Staudt Email: [email protected] Arizona State University U. S. A.